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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
R. MILTON YORGASON,
Salt Lake County Assessor,
Plaintiff, Appellant,

vs.
COUNTY ROARD OF EQUALIZATION
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, ex. rel.,
EPISCOPAL M.ANAGEMENT CORP.,

Case No. 18086

Defendant, Respondant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
R. MILTON YORGASON
SALT LAKE COUNTY ASSESSOR

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Cons is tent

with

the duties

plaintiff Salt Lake County Assessor,

of his emplo,'rnent,

the

caused the real property

and improvements located at 650 South 3rd East, Salt Lake City,
County of Salt Lake to be assessed and duly taxed.

Episcopal

Manaoement Corporation, the owner of the propertv, sought review
rf the

to the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization

rJaim1ng complete exemption

taxation on the basis nf the

''hrlrltable exemption found in Article 13, Section 2 of the Utah
I

( • 1"l

t i_

t

j

HGnrd

,, :

',,r,

: h•'

t_ ) 0

r. .

The assessment having been vacated by the County

Equalization,
Goard' s

the plaintiff Assessor,

d0rision

c,t

sought review

the state administrative

level

before the State Tax Commission of UL1h,
division of the Third District Court.
being upheld by the District Court,

and later

in the tax

The claimed exemption

the plaintiff Assessor, row

seeks the review by this Court of the lower Court's decision.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

The Tax Division of the Third Judicial District Court,
the Honorable Judge Dean Conder presiding, dismissed the plaintiff's Writ of Review with prejudice, finding the property to be
used exclusively for a

charitable purpose and thereby exempt

from taxation pursuant to Article XIII, Section two of the Utah
Constitution and UCA Section 59-2-30, as amended 1953.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Plaintiff/appellant seeks review and reversal of the
lower Court's Judgment and pravs that the case bP remanded back
to the District Court, with direction that said Court make and
enter its judgment and decree to state that the defendant's
of the St. Marks Tower property is not exclusively for charitable purposes and that such propertv be placed upon the tax
rolls of Salt Lake County,

and that the same be dulv assessed

and taxed for tax years 1980 and followinq.

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The respondent, Episcopal Management, was organized as
a nonprofit corporation in the State of Utah in April of 1978.
IT.P.

p34)

The purpose of the Corporation is to aid the elderly

and handicapped through the construction of housing for those
people using all federal,
which might

be

available.

state and private housing assistance
(T.R.

p34)

The Corporation was

provided specific authority to do what was necessary in order to
obtain federal monies under Section 202 of the National Housing
Act of 1959.

(T.R. p35)

The Board of Directors is authorized to have from five
to nine members with the Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of Utah
being an

unremovable

Board member.

(Article Seventh of the

Corporate Articles as attached to the transcript of the hearing
before the Utah State Tax Commission,

such transcript being

ircluded in the trial record by stipulation of the parties, at
T.R. p38)
The Corporate Articles cannot be amended without the
consent of the Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese.
'_or·nth,

Ibid)

L1 pon

(Article Thir-

dissolution of the Corporation,

the net

proceeds may be given to any organization operAted for charit• h l t',

edccat1onal,

:'th,

rbin).

relio1ous or scientific purposes.

(Article

After incorporation, the Management Corporation

applied and received a loan of
of Housing and Urban Development
mortgage.

(T.R. p37)

from the SPr:cPtar:
1111'1')

serured by a

With these funrls in hand,

fort]' yecar

thf' crrporation

acquired the subject land and built the housing pro1ect known ac
the St. Marks Tower consisting of 98 rental units, common areas
and administrative office.

(T.R. p36)

A Stipulation of Facts was entered by the parties.
(T.R.

a)

p33-39)

Among the uncontested facts were the following:

Both the mortgage and operating expenses of the Tower are
sustained solely by rent-. al revenue.

b)

The

rental

amount

(T. R. p3 8)

is established on

the

basis of

fair

market value for equivalent facilities in the communitv as
required by HUD regulations.
c)

(T.R. p37)

Of the current rental amount of $433.00 per month per unit,
the

tenant

pays

only one quarter of his

earnings towards such housing and the
pays the balance.
d)

or

federal

her gross
government

(T. R. p3 I)

To be eligible for these accommodations,

the tenant cannot

have annual earnings of more than $12,000.0n, or
for a couple.
e)

(T. R. p37)

The tenant must be at least
however no more than

vears nf agP or handicapperl,

of the tenants

handicapped classificatinn.

(T.R. p'li)

fall

Certain additional facts were learned at the administrative hearing before the Utah State Tax Commission.
is only bound bv law to provide a decent,
housing
Tower,

facility

The Tower

safe and sanitary

(testimony of Operations Director for

P 10, L 22-25,

the

State Tax Commission transcript)

Its

management attempts through coordination of outside services to
keep the tenant
setting.

independent and away

from the nursing home

It is not, however, a substitute for nursing home care

(page 8-13, 53-54, State Tax Commission transcript).
There are no tenants living in the facility without
charge.
The plaintiff/appellant levied the required property
tax assessment on the Tower property believing the property's
use not to be a truly charitable one as defined by Utah Constitution and Statute.

(T.R. p47)

The lower Court held against the

salt Lake County Assessor thereby concluding that the property
is used exclusively for charitable purposes and therefore exempt
from taxation.

From this ruling, plaintiff appealed.

POINT I

SERVING A SOCIAL NEED BY PROVIDING LOW-INCOME
HOUSING IS APART FROM AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A
CHARITABLE PURPOSE AS DEFINED BY UTAH LAW.

The

defendant/respond0rct

h0s

foc:"usec!

on

national

studies in an attempt to show Salt J0ke County has a need for
low-income housing.

Fowever, even assuming this County has a

deficiency in low-cost housing for

its elderly,

charitable use is not simply a finding that a

an exclusive

social need is

being served.
In Beerman Foundation Inc., v Board of Tax Appeals 87
N.E. 2d 474, 475
apartments

for

earning power.

(Ohio 194Cl), a nonprofit foundation constructecl
occupancoy

by war

veterans

who

had

impaired

The monthly rental was $35.00, however, the fair

value of comparable units was
amounted to a rent subsidy.

$75.00.

The Court

found

this

The Court quoted the Appeals Board

as saying:
.. None are housed free of cost.
If applicant's
space were not available these eight tenants
would presumably have to find less Clesirable
quarters within their means.
Is applicant's
philanthropy in
foregoing
a profit the
criterion? ..
The Court later answers this question by stating:
The use of the property in the instant case is
primarily for furnishing low rent housing and not
exclusively for charitahle purposes.
The resulting tax exemption in finding ar exclusivclv
charitable purpose is the re2son

for differentiatino

frcm a charitable purpose.

bv a taxpayer takirq upon 1ts

Onl}

shoulders what the taxing entit·• rrc>sently carries or

b

social

is ,,),-

ligated to assume,

will the taxpayer be allowed to escape its

share of taxes.
In United Presbyterian Association v Board of County
Commissioners 448 P. 2d 967, 975

(Colorado 1975), the Court dealt

with the exemption status of a senior citizen's home.

Finding

aaainst the charitable exemption the Court said,
The Justification for charitable tax exemption,
especially insofar as the rights of the body
politic are involved, is that if the charitable
work were not being done by a private party, it
would have to be undertaken at public expense.

*****
.. The furnishing of homes to older adults is not
in itself a charitable purpose.
Here the defendant provides no real services which the
County would

otherwise

have

to

provide.

No

justification

therefore exists for granting the exemption.
The defendant

has emphasized that

it obtained the

needed funding for the Tower from federal HUD monies and that
the National Housing Act, which authorizes such funds, clearly
s0ts forth

the

need for low-income housing.

Yet the federal

;tatutory provisiors do not hinge any funding on the property
being tax exempt from local taxation.
·11.d

Again,

the social need

'.he tax exemption are based on different criteria.

11,S.C.A. SPction 1701 et SPQ.

See 12

In Paraclete Mar(H of Kansas Cit\' v StatP 'T'ax rommio:sion 447 S.W.2d 311, 312-315

(M1sc,ouri

the plaintiff

19r;q)

USPd

the same federal funding as defendant in the present case.

in the instant case, the rents were geared to pay
gage and ongoing expenses.

As

the mort-

Unlike the Tower, which gets what

the market will allow,the rent was

found to be $25.00-$30.00

less

community.

than comparable units

in

the

A2- though

the

tenants were charged equally for the same kind of unit, many
received other welfare or, as in the present case,
from

the

federal

The Court

government.

ruled

supplements

against

the

charitable exemption finding:
... that it was thus intended to be completely
self-supporting and self-liquidating without any
intention that gifts or charity were to be involved; [and] that it is thus actually competitive
with landlords offering other residential property
for rent on which taxes must be paid, ...
The Paraclete Manor Court,

the United Presbvterian

Association case, and the earlier noted Beerman opinion all keep
in tact those reasons for allowing a tax exemption.

That beir.q

the act of giving which results in a displacement of government
services and subsequent savings of public monies.

The defendant

here qives no gifts as part of its dav-to-day operations
takes over no current County
exists under existiny t0sts

services.

No

reason

therefore

for charitable tcix PXPmptinns tn

grant the property said PY.emption.

The defendant persuaded the lower Court that but for
its housing facility, some of its tenants might be found in Utah
nursing homes with Medicaid incurring the bill.

(T.R. p60)

Even

if this were found to be more than mere speculation, it would
not be pertinent in that Salt Lake County as an entity does not
Medicaid.
pro quo

This Court has required the above mentioned quid

relationship to exist

B.P.O.E.

in Salt Lake Lodge No.

v Groesbeck 40 Utah 1,

120P 192,

194

(1911).

85,
The

present facts are void of any services being supplied by the
defendant

for which the plaintiff County would otherwise be

obligated

to

property

pay.

taxation,

maintained

because

Since

this

case deals

no

exemption

of

the

lack

based
of

on

only with County
charity

displacement

of

can

be

local

government responsibilities.
The plaintiff is not attempting to demean the useful
service

the defendant

is

supplying.

As brought out in the

h0aring at the State Tax Commission, the defendant is making the
lives of its tenants much more pleasant.
supportinq a finding of charity

However, the facts

do not exist in this case.

POINT II

TPF ACT OF MAKING A GIFT IS ESSENTIAL TO AN
EXCLUSIVELY CBAFITABLE PURPOSE AND DEFENDANT DOES
NOT C'C'·NTRIRfTTE ANYTHING TO ITS TENANTS.

Clearly,

a findino

0f

char l t;' includes a

f11cdJ

giving.

In Salt Lake Countv v Tax Commission et al.,

641, 643

(Utah 1979), the Court wrote,

ng of
P)d

Charity is the contribution or dedicatio11 of
something of value to the poor or at least to the
common good ... By exempting property used for
charitable purposes, the constitutional convention sought to encourage individual or group
sacrifice for the welfare of the community.
An
essential element of charity is giving. (emphasis
added)
In the present facts,
funds to build the Tower.

thP defendant borrowed federal

The mortgage and day-to-day expenses

are paid either bv the tenant or the same federal funds as used
to build the project.
ration which has
exemption.

The Tower is managed by a private corpo-

the right

to make a

profit and claims no

The would-be taxpaver as owner of the facility has

contributed nothing of relative significance in alleviating the
needs of our elderly,

yet now claims a tax exemption on the

basis of its charity.
The lower Court was convinced by the defendant that
the source of the charitable gift is irrelevant.

Thus by the

federal government providing rent subsidies to keep the building
running, the
charitable intent.

of the property w0s somehow masked with the
It

seems cr,vi 0us t,h2t before a

deserves exemption status due to

charity, the landowner must

be the source of the gift and the propertv
sively for the charitable purpose.

10

la11downer

be used

The element of personal sacrifice has
standing requirement to a finding of charity.

long been a

In Friendsview

Manor v State Tax Commission 420 P.2d 77, 80-81

(Oregon 1966),

the Court had a similar set of facts before it.

A retirement

home was claiming exemption from real property taxation as a
charitable institution.
funds,

The property did not receive federal

but required a substantial founder's fee, monthly rental

and received voluntary community gift support.

The Court found

the petitioner in a few instances did pay all or part of the
founder's

fee and monthly charges for persons unable to pay.

The petitioner alleged that its charitable purpose is evidenced
in its care of the elderly whether rich or poor.
against the exemption.

The Court held

It found it essential that the property

be donated by others and not purchased by the users of the
property

before

a

charitable

exemption

would

be

granted.

Quoting an earlier case, the Court wrote,
that in order for the activities of a
taxpayer to entitle him to exemption as "social
welfare" work they must be calculated to benefit
some other group than the one which supplies the
money and directs its disposition ... [I]n the
benefaction some mode of altruism must clearly
shine forth. (emphasis added)
The present facts hold not the tenant paving the large
rr·en t age

of

nePded

:-en ta 1,

but

the

federal

government.

1sticiill:' +-he taxpauers of th1s N<Jticr 2re t:he ones supply'nn the needPd support.

Public funds have nevPr been considered

11

a charitable gift.

The defe,.,rlant,

1<ould be oblicrcit0rl

<''l•'

tn

pe1y the property tax, has gi'ien nntl11nq.
It should be remembered that the Cruntv as an irdeperdent taxing unit with its independent budqet responsibilitiec ic
the one which will lose the tax revenue otherwise generated by
defendant and others engaged in similar tasks.

The taxpayers of

this Nation are the only group having given anything in this
case, and they have done so void of any altruistic intent.

The

defendant being exempt from federal income taxation is the onlv
entity which has contributed nothing,
based on its benevolence.

but

This Court,

seeks an exemption

along with other .state

courts, looks to the defendant taxpayer's charitable intent, the
use of the property and the
services.

displacement of government

This defendant has made no significant gift of itsel'.

and assumes no County government responsibilities.

The pcoper+y

is not used exclusively for charitable purposes.
The

lower Court's

necessary funding was

ruling

irrelevant

that

the

source

of

the

in determinina the exclusi•·p

charitable character of the would-be taxpayer,

is contrary to

the mandate of this Court 3ncJ others which recuire a chari talJlP
or benevolent intent be &ound to exist in the
exclusively
Douglas

v

charitable

OFA

Senior

use

•>t

Citizen's

the

and, a•

prnocrt\.

Inc.,

111

NW

d

7l9 ,

(Nebraska 1961), the Nebraska Court was fciced w1 th s1rni 1,ir

o.s this Court

is presently.

income

to the elderly on a nonprofit basis.

rental

The building was used for

low-

Social

programs were provided and the rental was based upon costs of
upkeep and amortization of the mortgage.

The residents were

accepted without determining whether they could pay the rental
or not and many were subsidized by receiving work and assistance
in order that

they could meet

the

rent.

The tenants were

required to pay the rental amount although inability to pay did
not result in eviction.

The rental, however, was never abated

and outside sources were sought to pay the owed amounts.
specific

rights were granted the

tenants

to

remain in the

facility without payment of the rental from some source.
the exemption was

No

Again

The Court said,

In this it is not difficult to perceive that the
operations of the defendant included worthy
charitable aspects but it may not well be said
that this ownership and use was exclusively
charitable ...

The elements the Nebraska Court found to be control'ing are clearly present here.
''r

the costs of maintaining the building and amortizing the

mortgage.
1

The defendant bases its rental

The

tenants

have

no express

rights which would

•0vent their eviction if the monthly rental could not be paid.

1•

nrt

they were unable to pav their share of the rent, they could
rr'sicle

at

the

faciUty.

13

The

Court specifically

finds that rental payments by thirct parti0s is not suffirient tn
grant the landowner taxpayer charitaule status. The promotion
the charitable intent being a significant element in the 0xemption status.
The defendant is improving the living conditions of
some of the area elderly and plaintiff would not belittle that
effort.
does

But as shown above, the defendant as a taxpaying entity

not

fulfill

the elements of an exclusively charitable

institution and the taxpayers of Salt Lake County should not
shoulder the defendant's property tax responsibilit"'·

POINT

rr:r

THE PAPENT ENTITY OF THE DEFENDANT MAY WELL
BENEFIT BY THE TOWER PROPERTY AND SUCH BENEFIT
PF.EVENTS AN EXEMPTION BASED ON AN EXCLUSIVE
CHARITABLE PURPOSE.
As noted in the Statement of Facts, the Bishop of the
Episcopal Diocese of Utah is a permanent member of the defendant's

Board of Directors.

The l>.rticles

cannot

without his vote being amongst the majority.
Thirteen of the defendant's

be amencted

(Article Seven and

of Incorporation)

dissolution of the Corporatinn,

Upon

the net proceec's ma'/ go to an··

religious or charitable institution which ob••iously inrludes th•
Episcopal Church.

(Article Twelve, Ibict)

14

Effectivelv, the Episcopal Church has built a 98 unit
residential complex at no cost to itself.

The complex is run at

no cost to it and if it is later sold, the entire sales price
will be a nontaxable gain.
and

can make a

fantastic

The Diocese has aided the area aged
sum of money at

the

same

time.

Plaintiff does not attempt to place this possibility in an
unfavorable
enuring

to

light.
the

However,

the possibility of the benefit

Episcopal Church is

religious needs can be benefitted.

real.

Both social and

However, this outlook does

prevent a tax exemption on the b2sis of an exclusive charitable
purpose.
In Parker et al v Quinn 23 Utah 332, 64 P. 961, 962
fUtah

1901),

the

plaintiff as

trustee held

legal

title

to

property for the benefit of the Fifteenth Ward Relief Society.
The taxable property was a two-story building, the upper level
used by the Relief Society for

its exclusive charitable and

work. The lower level was rented out and the proceeds
contributed toward the furtherance of the charitable work.

This

Court found that property held by the Society as a source of
income was not used for an exclusively charitable purpose, even
though the income was put toward the charitable function.
The same result occurred in the Idaho case of Malad

Ward of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v
Stat<-' Tax Commissi0n

269

P.2d 1077,

ls

1079

(1954).

There, the

land of the plaintiff was usc,c1 to

raise'

mately used in the Church's

hlhc>at which was ulti-

1:•rnCJrcim.

The Court held

charitable exemption existed under the farts.

nc'

It sajd,

Conceding the claimant to be organized as a
charitable institution or society, it is not
entitled to exemption from taxation on property
which it owns and from which it derives a revenue, even if the funds or produce so derived are
devoted exclusivelv to charitable purposes.
The defendant in the present case has yet to contribute the gain from the Tower to its parent Diocese.
the

established

doctrine

of

strict

pertained to tax exemptions.
cases on this
exemption.
retaining

subject,

construction

However,

has

always

As the Parker Court stated,

in

all doubts must be resolved aaainst

Therefore, the very real possibility of the Diocese
the

large

gain

created

by

the

Tower

project,

eliminates the Tower from obtaining exemption status based on an
exclusive charitable purpose.

POINT IV

THIS COURT Hi'\.S PREVIOUSLY HELD THAT HOUSING
FACILITIES SUCH AS DEFENDANT'S DO NOT CONSTITUTE
A USE FOR AN EXCLUSIVELY CHARITABLE PURPOSE.
The defendants ir the lower Court attempted to
entiate itself from the Friendship Manor property.

; 6

The elcme'lts

f"his Court

focused

on in Friendship Manor Corporation v Tax

Commission /6 Ut2h 2d 227, 487 P.2d 1272, 1275-1280

(1971), in

dPnying the tax PXemption are equally present in this case.
The Friendship Manor opinion dealt with a nonprofit
organization comprised of five religious denominations which had
financed a high-rise residential complex through federal funds.
The building was especially designed for elderly persons and
social programs were amply provided.

The tenants had to be able

to physically take care of themselves and the management required the tenants pay for what thPy received.

The rental for

the units was set so that the rental alone would pay for all
upkeep and provide for retirement of the mortgage period.

The

plaintiff taxpayer argued that it should be found tax exempt due
to

its nonprofit

status,

its stated purpose,

status under federal tax law,

its charitable

the specially designed building

?nd the social programs that it provided.
In the reportPd opinion, this Court examined several
State Court casPs on the topic.

Quoting the New Mexico

Court it said,
It is clear that rents are fixed at an amount
riPcessary to pay the interPst, amortize the
principal, ard pay all expenses of maintaining
the propPrty.
By what theory this should not
include taxes on the same basis as other comparable properties is not clear to us...
It was
intended to be self-supporting, without any
thought that gifts or charity be involved.
Mountainview Homes, Inc., v State Tax Commission
427 P.2d 13 (1967)
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The

present

facts

fall well wit-hin the quidPl_ines

expressed by the Utah and New Mexjco Courts.

The Tower charqes

rent comparative to similar units in the area.

The rental is

gauged so to pay all costs of maintenance and mortgage combined.
Although the federal government pays for a large portion of the
rental, the owner of the facility is giving nothing.
assuming a burden of government.
the burden.

It is not

The government is discharging

None of the funds used to run the facility are

donated by anyone holding an altruistic intent.
In holding against the exemption, the Friendship Manor
Court focused on the fact that the rental for Friendship Manor
units was not based on need, but what was required to retire the
principle, together with upkeep expenses.

Here, the rental is

calculated on the same basis as Friendship Manor.

The tenants

portion of the rent is based on their gross earnings.

The

rental actually due is in no way a reflection of the tenants
ability to pay.

Further,

the rental portion not paid by the

tenant is not paid by the defendant or any third party wishing
The facts determined in the earlier

to make a charitable gift.

case are equally determinative here.
In the recent past, this Court has decided a rumber Jf
Fraternal Lodge cases where the issue was whether the property
was used exclusively for charitable purpose.

See Benevolent and

Protective Order of Elks v Tax Commission 536 P.2d 1214
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(Utah

1975)

and

Loyal Order of Moose No.

259 v County Board of

Equalization of Salt Lake County 657 P.2d 257

(Utah 1982).

These cases have dealt not with the charitable function of the
individual organization,

but with

the exclusiveness

of the

charitable work provided by each entity upon the property for
which the exemption was claimed.
The present facts deal not with whether the defendant
functions solely as a charitable organization, but whether its
only

function

fits

within the very narrow confines of the

charitable definition.

This difference in issue is a thin, but

very significant one.

The Tower's activities do not include

both

charitable

and

nonchari table

purposes.

Its

financial

organization and payment policy either pushes the Tower property
into the tax exemption or prevents its property from being found
charitable.
The Utah case most factually similar to the present is
obviously the Friendship Manor opinion.

That case also began

the marked swing toward the more stringent view of tax exemptions visible in this Court's latest opinions.

No longer is the

individual responsibility of local taxation shifted onto the
shoulders of others based on labels resembling a charitable use,
yPt lacking the essential intent and elements of such charity.
Too
to grant

needed local government proqrams currently go unfunded
local

tax exemptions to those who do not hold the

l lJ

benevolent self-giving intent so much a part of the term charity.

The burden upon the over-burdened taxpayer is constantly

increasing.
The Tower

simply does

not

furnish

those

services

currently financed by Salt Lake County and clearly lacks the
fact and the intent of giving, all of which are needed before a
charitable purpose is established.

POINT V

THE PROVISION OF GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIZED LOW INCOME
HOUSING IS NOT A FUNCTION FOR WHICH CHARITABLE
EXEMPTIONS ARE GIVEN.
Low

income

housing whereby

the

tenants

receive

a

higher living standard for the rent they pay with public funds
paying the remaining rental

amounts,

is

not an exclusively

charitable function.
In Hilltop Villaqe Inc. v Kerrville Independent School
District 487 S.W.2d 167,

168-169

(Tf'xas 197'.'),

the nonprofit

corporation had earlier lost a legal battle on the issue of the
charitable tax exemption,

amended its Articles so to fit within

the initial Court opinion and fought the same issue in a later
tax year.

The Amended Articles specific2lly gave the tPnants

the right to remain in the facility even though they could not
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pay th0 costs of thPir care.

The Facility included a nursing

home and the facts indicated that tenants were at least charged
or. the basis of their government assistance.

Where the rental

payments were insufficient to pay for upkeep and retirement of
the mortgage, bona fide gifts and voluntary contributions were
sought.
the

The Court again held against the tax exemption because

tenants were

accepted on the basis of their

fina.ncial

circumstances which was the government assistance payment.
The Tower's Articles of Incorporation are void of
language stating the tenant's right to remain in the facility
without the government payments along with the payment of one
fourth of the tenant's gross earnings.

Unlike Hilltop,

the

Tower receives no revenue from gifts or voluntary contributions.
The Tower is not licensed to perform the activities of a nursing
home,

as

Hilltop was,

and the Tower can not rPplioice those

services a nursing home provides as Hilltop did.
The Tower's sole purpose, that of accepting government
payments to pay the required rPntal which is set at a fair
value,

does not approach the charity even provided by

flilltcp and should not be accorded a charitable exemption.
In Lutheran Home, Inc. v Board of County Commissioners
ot Dickinson Countv 505 P.2d 1118,

1124-1125

(Kansas 1973)

a

nursino home-residential fucility appealed the County's rejec•1cr.

cf their exemption upplication.

The F2cility chLlrged fair

market value

for

its premises with 01w-hi'llf 0f

making the rental by use of

thP

tenants

their Wcoltare assistance.

The

rental income was sufficient to maintain the building and pay
off the mortgage.

In discussing the applicablP law,

the Court

cited those cases listed by the defendant, Episcopal Management,
ruling for exemption under apparently similar facts.
rejected those holdings outright,

The Court

instead quoting with

from Mason v Zimmerman 106 p 1005, 1008

(Kansas 1910)

favor

it said

•.. "charity" is a gift to promote the welfare of
others in need, and "charitable" as used in the
constitutional and statutory provisions means
intended for charity.
In this sense charity
involves the doing of something generous for
other human beings who are unable to provide for
themselves ..
Unless there is a gift, there can
be no charity.
The Court specifically equated the use of public funds
to pay the required rental with that of family funds and refused
to find such monies to be in any way charitable.

Re:iecting the

charitable exemption, the Court based its decision 0n the lack
of any gift from the plaintiff corporation to the residents of
the home or to any one else.
The only difference betwPen the Tower and Luthcri'ln
Home Inc. opinion, is that public funds are a laraer part of thP
Tower's revenue.
case.

No gifts or contributions exist

in eitlwr

As noted by the Kansas Court, the promotion cf

gifts being the purpose beh"nd the exemption, no such c,xernpt inr

) )

can be granted without

the gifts existence.

As

the Court

public funds are not gifts.
Another case factually similar to the present is Dow
City

Senior Citizen's

Housing,

Inc.,

v Board of Review of

Crawford County 230 N.W.2d 497, 498-499 (Iowa 1975).

There some

business men organized the plaintiff corporation without compensation.

The land was cleared by volunteer labor.

Cash dona-

tions were recf'ived in the form of outright gifts and "memberships" selling for $25.00 each which gave the holder voting
rights only.

The FHA loan used by the corporation required the

tenants to earn no more than $9,000.00 annually.

Although the

rental was not adjusted on need, the Court specifically found no
one had ever been rejected for inability to pay the rent.

The

facility was self-supporting and the units rental was markedly
low for their quality.
Pxemption basing its
monPy.

The Iowa Court held against the tax

finding on the use of government loan

It said,
..the government, through the FHA loan program,
has already assumed a large share of the burden
of meeting the need for low-rent housing for
elderly persons.
Plaintiff has not shown that
the exemption statute should be applied in its
favor to create an additional burden on other
propert:,• taxpayers in the community. (emphasis
added)
The

Iowa Court pointed out that the plaintiff was

meeting a real need tor the elderly persons in the area, but
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meeting a social need was separate and 0part from a charitable
use.
The Tower not only relies on public funding for its
mortgage, but is dependent on the same public funding to pay
back the government mortgage.

Like Dow City,

the Tower now

wishes the local taxpayers to take on the additional burden of
paying its property tax responsibility.
The cases discussed above indicate that low income
housing rarely

fits

charitable exemption.

within

the

narrow construction of the

Case law shows that such housing is never

given a charitable exemption when public funds are used to pay
the needed rental.

CONCLUSION

The defendant has organized a corporation to provide
the elderly a nicer environment in which to live out
lives.

their

The Tower receives no gifts or contributions and in fact

is entirely self-supporting by use of public funcs and tenant
rent.

Its goals are laudable, but its methods fall far

strict construction
exemption cases.

this

Court

has

requirPd

The Tower's property

is

not

of

the

charitable

us Po

for

an

exclusive charitable purpose as the Utah Constitution intPnded
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the term to be defined and as case law has interpreted it.

The

defendant must be required to pay its share of the local tax
obligation.
The decision of the Trial Court should be reversed and
the subject property should be placed upon the tax rolls of Salt
Lake County for the year 1980 and all subsequent years.

Respectfully submitted this
29th day of April, 1983,
THEODORE CANNON
Salt Lake County Attorney

Special

Attorney

Deputy

County

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I,
two true and
to Albert J.
prepaid, at
84101,

Bill Thomas Peters, do hereby certify that I mailed
correct copies of the aforegoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Colton, Attorney for Defendant-Respondent, postage
800 Continental Bank Bldg., Salt Lake City, Utah

Chi> 29Ch

day of April,
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July 9, 1985

Geoffrey Butler, Esq., Clerk
Utah Supreme Court
322 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re:
R. Milton Yorgason v. County Board of Equalization
of Salt Lake County, ex. rel., Episcopal Management
Corp., Case No. 18986
Dear Mr. Butler:
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, the Episcopal Management Corp., defendant-respondent, submits supplemental authority in the above-referenced
appeal.
This matter was argued before the Court on October
16, 1984.
The Episcopal Management Corp. wishes to bring to
the Court's attention, the case of Rio Vista Non-Profit
Housing Corp. v. County of Ramsey, 277 N.W. 2d 187 (Minn.
1979), a copy of which is attached hereto.
In Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., No.
17699 (filed June 26, 1985), the Utah Supreme Court enumerated six factors "which must be weighed in determining whether
a particular institution is, in fact, using its property
'exclusively for .
. charitable purposes.'" Id. slip op. at
6.
The six factors enumerated were adapted from the six-part
test set forth by the Minnesota Supreme Court in North Star
Research Institute v. County of Hennepin, 306 Minn. 1,6, 236
N.\'I. 2d 754, 757 (1975).
Id. slip op. at 6 n. 6.
In a subsequent case, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed whether "a non-profit corporation which provides
housing under a
. . federally subsidized program to families
of modest incomes [is] an_ institution of
Rio Vista Non-Profit Housing Corp. v. GP t
or
!.77 N.W. 2d 187, 189 (Minn. 1979).
In that ca: e, t e.
M1 nnesota Supreme Court applied its six-factor
-

LAW QFF1CES 01'

FABIAN & CLENDENIN

Geoffrey Butler, Esq., Clerk
Page 2
mining that such a non-profit corporation was an institution
of purely public charity.
Id. at 190-92. The Minnesota
Supreme Court addressed the-Very issues which are before this
Court in the instant appeal.
In particular, the Rio Vista
court held that federal government support of a non-profit
corporation satisfies the requirement that a charitable
institution be supported by donations and gifts.
Id. at
190-91.
In fact, the Rio Vista court concluded that the
non-profit housing corporation in that case met each of the
six factors of Minnesota Law.
Because the six factors
enumerated by the Utah Supreme Court are almost identical to
those enumerated by the Minnesota Supreme Court, the Minnesota
Supreme Court's decision in Rio Vista is of particular import
to the instant appeal.
Sincerely,
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
A Professional Corporation

JESR/AJC/lah
Enclosure
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing
letter to be mailed, postage fully prepaid, to: Bill Thomas
Peters, No. 10 Exchange Place, Suite 1000, Salt Lake City,
OCeh 84lll chi>

f""

dey of
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RIO VISTA NO!'l-PROFIT HOUS. CORP. v. RAMSEY CTY.

Minn.

..2dl87

In th• Matter of th• P•tition of RIO VISTA SOS-PROFIT HOL:SISG CORPORA TJOS for Rni•w of Objections to
Real Property Taxes Payable in 1976,
App•llant,
v.

COUNTY OF RAMSEY, Respondent.
SUit• of Minn•sota, R•spondent.
No. 48302.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
Feb. 23, 1979
Nonprofit corporation, which provided
housing under a federally subS1dized program to families of modest income, appealed from ruling of District Court, Ramsey
County, Stephen L. Maxwell, J., which held
that it was not an institution of purely
public charity and therefore not exempt
from taxation. The Supreme Court, Todd,
J., held that: (!) nonprofit corporation
qualified as institution of purely public
charity, and (2) statute providing for assessments based on 20% market value on cer·
lain low-rent housing did not apply to nonprofit corporation.
Reversed.
I. Taxation <:=241.1(1)
to be considered in determining
whether an entity comes within definition

of a "charit) ··for taxation purposes are. (!)
stal<'d purpose of undertaking, (2) Y•hether
entity involved is supported by donations,
131 w hcthcr recipients of the "charity" are
required to pay for assistance received, (4)
whethf•r income received produces a profit,

1\1 beneficiaries of the "charity" and (6)
whether dividends, or assets upon dissolution are available to pnvate interests.
Se-e publication Vv'ords and Phrases
for other 1ud1c1al constructions and
definitions

2.. Taxation <1=241.1(2)
For purposes of determining whether
nonprofit corporation providing federally
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subsidized housing was a "charity" so a.s to
be exempt from real estate l<lxation, fact
that federal government, and not a private
institution was donor did not preclude determination that nonprofit corporation was
supported in part by donations. M.S.A.
Const art. 10, § 1; M.S.A. § 272.02.

3. Charities <1= l
Nonprofit corporation's providing of
housing for low and moderate income families furthered a charitable objective and
lessened burdens of government so a.s to
satisfy one of six factors employed in determining whether an institution could properly be defined as a "charity."
4. Taxation <1=241.1(5)
Fact that portion of rents received by
nonprofit corporation, which provided housing for families of modest income, was from
tenants did not preclude finding that nonprofit corporation qualified as an institution
of purely public charity so as to be entitled
to l<lx exemption where federal government subsidized tenant's payments to such
an extent that tenants did not provide a
major source of project's revenue.
5. Taxation <1=241.1(2)
Nonprofit corporation, which provided
housing under a federally subsidized program to families of modest income, qualified as a ux-exempt institution of purely
public charity. M.S.A.Const. art. 10, § I;
M.S.A. § 272.02.
6. Taxation <1=241.1(2)
Statute providing for assessments
based on 20% of market value on certain
low-rent housing did not apply to nonprofit
corporation, which provided housing under
a federally subsidized program to families
of modest income so as to qualify a.s a
Uix-€xempt institution of purely public
charity M.SA §§ 272.02, 273.13, subd. 17;
M.S A.Const. art. 10, § I.

Syllabus by the Court
l. Appellant nonprofit corporation,
which provides housing under a Federally
subsidized program to families of modest
income, qualifies as a tax-exempt institution of purely public charity.
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Minn St 273 13, subd 17, which im-

poses a 20-pereent tax on certain low-rent

housing, does not apply w tax..,xempt institutions of purely public charity.
Doherty, Rumble & Butler and Timothy
Halloran, St Paul, for appellant.
William Randall, County Atty., St.even
DeCoster and Thomas Poch, Asst County
Attys., St Paul, Warren Spannaus, Atty.
Gen, James W. Neher, Special Asst. Atty.
Gen, Dept of Revenue, St Paul, for respondents
Heard before PETERSON, TODD, and
SCOTT, JJ., and considered and decided by
the court en bane

TODD, Justice.
Rio Visu Non-Profit Housing Corporation (Rio Visl<l) was organized for the purpose of providing low-rent housing to families of modest income. The construction
costs and part of the renl<ll income are
from Federally subsidized programs. Rio
Visl<l challenged the assessment of real esLl!t.e Ll!xes against its property. The trial
court allowed the Ll!xes, asserting that Rio
Visl<l was not an institution of purely public
charity and therefore not exempt from Ll!xat1on \\'e reverse
The matt.er was submitted to the trial
court on stipulated facts, together with
brief and oral testimony on behalf of Ramsey County The transcript of the oral testimony was not furnished on appeal. Essentiaily, the stipulated facts disclose that
I.

In 1972. the basic rents were $109 for a 1bedroom unit and S 154 for a 2-bedroom unit.

and the market rents were $169 and $239, reJn 1975, the basic rent of the I-bedroom unit was raised to S 125, and the 2-bedroom urut was raised to $165

The market rent

increased to S 186 and $246. respe-cuvely
In
J 976, the basic rent increased
charging the

tenants for electnc1ty

2.

To be eligible for payment of a monthly rent

Jess than the fair market value rent estabilshed
for the unit, a tenanl must not have income m
excess of the following amounts

Rio Visl<l was incorporated in 1971 as a
nonprofit corporation under Minn.St. c. 317.
The purpose of the corporation was to pr<>vide low-rent housing to families of low and
moderate incomes. A 48-unit complex was
completed in 1972. The entire cost of con·
struction was financed by a bank under the
Federal Housing Program known as "section 236... Under this program, the Federal
Government guarantees the loan and pays
directly to the bank the differenC€ between
the 7-percent interest charged by the bank
on the loan and the I-percent interest on
the loan charged to and paid by Rio Vista.
Payments on the principal are also paid by
Rio Visu.
The loan is repaid mainly through rents
charged to the tenants. Under the section
236 program, Rio Vista must establish two
standards of rent-{!) basic rent determined according to payments of principal
on the loan and the I-percent interest, and
(2) a fair market rent determined according
to the payments of principal, interest, and
mortgage insurance. 1 The fair market rent
is calculated according to amounts needed
to repay the loan. However, tenants who
satisfy the eligibility requirements of the
section 236 program 2 pay an amount of
rent equal to 25 percent of their income or
the basic rent, whichever is great.er. In no
event, however, is the tenant charged more
than the fair market rent. Almost all tenants at Rio Vista pay the basic rent and
none are wealthy enough to pay the fair
market rent.
Under a different Federal program-the
Rent Supplement Program-the Federal
Number of Persons
rn Household
l
2
3
4
5
6

person
persons
persons
persons
persons
persons

Maximum Annual

Income

s 9,600

ll,000
12,400
13,800

H.7oo

15.500

A tenant must also qualify as one of the
following (I) Be a member of a family of two
or more persons related by blood, marriage, or
operation of Jaw, who occupy the same unit,
(2) a single person, 62 years of age or older; (3)
physically handicapped. (4) a single person un·
der 62 years of age, provided that no more than

RIO VISTA NON-PROFIT HOUS. CORP. v. RAMSEY CTY.
Cite .. 2n N.W.ld 117

Government pays, for eligible tenants, an
amuunt equal to their basic rent minus 25
percent of their income The net result of
the rent supplement " that the eligible
tenants have to expend no more than 25
p..rcent of their income for rent. Nineteen
of the 48 tenants qualify for the rent supplement
Rio Vista paid real estate taxes on the
property from !974 to 1976 on the basis of a
20-percent assessment. The taxes in 1976
were $14,278 54 Rio Vista paid the first
half of these in !\lay 1976 and then brought
an artion to recover the 1976 taxes, arguing
1t is a tax-exempt chanty. 3 The trial court
dt'allowed the claim, asserting that Rio Vista was not an institution of purely public
charity so as to qualify for a tax-exempt
status as provided by Minnesota law

The issues presented are:
II) Is a nonprofit corporation which provides housing under a section 236 Federally
subsidized program to families of modest

1ncoml's an institution of purely public char-

ity for purposes of Minnesota real estate
taxes?
121 Is an institution of purely public charity obligated to pay real estate taxes under
!\!inn St. 273 13'

Several other jurisdictions have addressed
the question of whether privately operated,
low-rent housing is entitled to tax-exempt
status where funds or subsidies are provided by the Federal Government. These
courts have not been consistent in their
result or reasoning. Several courts have
determined that such housing is not tax
exempt because of such reasons as the significant rent paid by the tenants,• the donations came from the government rather
than private sources, 1 and low-income housing does not further a charitable objective.•
On the other hand, two courts have considered the tax-exempt status of section 236
housing in particular and both have concluded the housing is tax exempt. 1 A
Pennsylvania court also granted tax-exfrom Federal subs1d1es "comparable to charitable contnbut1ons from md1v1duals or corporauons " 566 S W 2d 223

I 0 percl:'nt of the available apartments art> rent-

4.

This acuon was brought under Minn Sl c
For an m-depth discussion of the grounds
and procedures for challenging Minnesota real
propert) taxes. see. Note, 4 Wm Mitchell
L Rev 37 I

2ik

In Mountain

Comm'n

i7

r...

5.
I.

Homes Inc \' State Tax
.\1ex 649. 427 P2d 13 (1967),

the cr•urt rPlwd hea\ ii) on the fact that the
!enanb .... ere charged rent in an amount suffi.
c1ent to pay the cost of the project

Westmin1ster Gerontology Foundation,
Suire Tax Comm n. 522 S W 2d 754
(l\lo !975). the !\11ssoun Supreme Court conIn
Inc

\I

cluded that the housing in question was not
entitled to a lax exemption as a chanty, relying
heai,.1Jy on the fact that s1gmf1cant rents were
collected from the tenants This case has smce
been disapproved by the Missouri court m
Franciscan Terruuy Pro\·
State Tax
Comm'n. 566 SW 2d 213 (Mo 1978). where the
\11ssoun Supreme Court indicated thal lhe case
erroneous]) overlooked the fact lhat the renls
had been provided at a substantial cosl Sa\,ngs
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1. Minnesota law provides a tax exemplion to institutions of purely public charity.
Minn.Const. art. 10, § !; Minn.St. 272.02,
subd. 6. There is no question that Rio Vista
is liable for the tax, as determined by the
trial court, if it does not qualify as a purely
public charity. The Internal Revenue Service and Minnesota Department of Revenue
have concluded that Rio Vista is a tax-exempt charity for the purpose of income
taxation, but these determinations are not
controlling on the issues before us.

ffi to such persons. or (5) a d1splacee

3.

Minn.

Waterbury First Church Housmg, Inc.

v.

Brown. 170 Conn 556, 367 A.2d 1386 (1976).

Although the Pennsylvania court had recognized in Four Freedoms House of Ph1/adelph1a,
Inc v Philade/ph1a, 443 Pa 215, 279 A.2d 155
( 1971 ). that Federally assisted housing for the
elderly is enl1lled to a Lax exemption, a Pennsylvania lower court has construed that dec1s1on as restncting the exemption to housing for
the elderly becaus' housing for low and moderate income persons does not further a charita·
ble objective. Metropolitan Pittsburgh Nonprofit Housing Corp v. Board of Property Assessment. Appeals and ReView, 28 Pa.

(Cmwlth.) 356, 368 A.2d 837 (1977).

7.

Banahan v. Presbyterian Housing Corp., 553
S w 2d 48 (Ky.1977), Franciscan Tertiary
Prov v Stace T.vc Comm 'n., supra. These
cases are virtually indistJnguishable from the
Rw Vista situation
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empt status to a similar housing project,
even though rent was paid by the tenants
becaust such rent was below fair market

charitable institution; (5) whether the
beneficiaries of the 'charity' are restricted or unrestricted and, if restricted,
whether the class of persons to whom the
charity is made available is one having a
reasonable relationship to the charitable
objectives; (6) whether dividends, in
form or substance, or assets upon dissolution are available to private interests."

rent. 8

The Minnesota Supreme Court has never
addressed thf' precise issue presented in this
case Although an exhaustive definition of
"charity" cannot be given, this court has
adopted the following general definition (In
re Junior Achievement of Greater Minneapolis v. S!<lte, 271 Minn. 385, 390, 135 N W.2d
881, 885 (1965])
"The legal meaning of the word 'charity' has a broader significance than in
common speech and has been expanded in
numerous decisions Charity is broadly
defined as a gift, to be applied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of
an indefinite number of persons 'by
bringing their hearts under the influence
of education or religion, by relieving their
bodies from disease, suffering, or constraint, by assisting them to establish
themselves for life, or by erecting or
maintaining public buildings or works, or
otherwise lessening the burdens of
government"
Accord, Mayo Foundation "· Commr. of
Revenue, 306 Minn. 25, 33, 236 N.W.2d 767,
771 (1975)
(1) Recently. this court set forth six factors to be considered in determining wheth-

er the entity in question comes within this

definition (North S!<lr Research Inst. v.
County of Hennepin, 306 Minn. 1, 6, 236
N.W.2d 754, 756 [1975])
• (!) whether the stated purpose of the undertaking is to be helpful to
others without immediate expectation of
material reward; (2) whether the entity
involved is supported by donations and
gifts in whole or in part; (3) whether the
recipienL() of the 'charity' are required to
pay for the assistance received in whole
or in part; (4) whether the income received from gifL, and donations and
charges to users produces a profit to the
8.

Accord, Minneso!Ji State Bar As.<n. v.
Commr. of Taxation, 307 Minn. 389, 392, 240
N.W.2d 321, 323 (1976); Mayo Foundation
v. Commr. of Revenue, 306 Minn. 34, 236
N.W.2d 772.
Applying these factors, there is little
question that three of them support the
conclusion that Rio Vista is a tax-..xempt
charity. Applying the first factor, the purpose of Rio Vista, as stated in its bylaws
and articles of incorporation, is to provide
housing to low and moderate income families on a nonprofit basis. Applying the
fourth factor, Rio Vista has not made a
profit, losing from $16,802 to $22,588 in the
years 1972 through 1976. Applying the
sixth factor, Rio Vista's articles of incorporation require that upon dissolution, the
assets shall be disposed of in a manner that
precludes any distribution to a private interest.
Application of the remaining factors
presents greater difficulty. The second factor looks to the extent of support by donations. Without a doubt, the very existence
of Rio Vista can be attributed to support
from the Federal Government because the
government guaranteed and funded in part
the low-interest construction loan and it
also provides a significant rent assistance.
There is some question, however, of whether this factor encompasses governmental
assistance as well as private donations.
The trial court concluded that the donations
must be private rather than public. However, at least one Minnesota case, as well as
cases from other jurisdictions,• indicates
that the donation may be from public as
less than cost. Annotation, 37 A.L.R.3d 1191.

Four Freedoms House of Ph1/adelph1a, Inc v

PhJ/adelph1a. supra Generally, courts are Jess
willing to deny the tax-exempt status when the
amounts paid by benef1c1anes of the chanty are
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well .., private sources In in re Claim of
As.1embly Homes, Inc 1· Ye/low Medicine
County, 2'13 Minn. 197, I40 N.W.2d 336
l 1%6), this court held that a nursing home
"a.s a tax-exempt chanty even though the
resident.' care was paid by the county we)fare boards and the Veterans Administration, as well .., by private contributions.
[2] We conclude that Rio Vista satisfies
the requirements of the second factor. The
fact that the donor is the Federal Government and not a private institution does not
preclude a determination that Rio Vista is
supported in part by donations
We now turn to the fifth factor-whether the class of beneficiaries has a reasonable
relationship to charitable objectives. Rio
V1sta argues that housing for low and moderate income families furthers a charitable
objective. As demonstrated by this court's
definition of "charity" set forth in In re
Junior Achievement of Greater Minneapolis
v. State, supra, this factor is intertwined
with the question of whether such housing
"lessens the burdens of government."
[3] We conclude that housing for low
and moderate income families furthers a
charitable objective and lessens the burdens
of government. It would be anomalous to
hold that governmental objectives are not
furthered by a nonprofit corporation which
implements a Federally created and funded
program The trial court concluded that
the burdens of government were increased
from the program because Federal funds
were spent. In this regard the trial court
confused the second factor of "donation"
w1th the fifth factor of "charitable objective." If private organizations did not im·
plement these Federally assisted housing
projects, presumably the government might
seek to implement them through government agencies. Thus, private organization
which assist the Federal Government in the
implementation of these projects do promote charitable objectives and Jessen the
burdens of government.
Our conclusion is buttressed by decisions
of this court and statements of the Minnesota Legislature. This court on several oc-
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casions ha.g stated that redevelop.nent and
construction of dwellings under housing and
redevelopment statutes ha.g a "public purpose" in the oontext of eminent domain.

Housing and Redevelopment Authority v.
Froney, 305 Minn. 450, 234 N.W.2d 894
(197.5); Housing and Redevelopment Authority v. Greenman, 255 Minn. 396, 96
N.W.2d 673 (1959); Thomas v. Housing and
Redevelopment Authority of Duluth, 234

Minn. 221, 48 N.W.2d 175 (1951). The legislature also ha.g declared that shortage of
housing for low and moderate income families is inimical to public welfare. Minn.St.
462A.02, subd. 2. By analogy. private entities that provide housing for low and moderate inoome families should be deemed to
further a public purpose and Jessen the burdens of government.
[ 4) The most troublesome issue is
presented by the application of the third
factor-whether recipients of the charity
are required to pay for the assistance in
whole or in part. This factor has been
considered in three Minnesota cases. In

Camping & Education Foundation v. State,

282 Minn. 245, 164 N.W.2d 369 (1969), this
court denied tax-<>xempt status to a camp
which was supported mainly through tuition, characterizing the camp as a "commercial activity." In Madonna Towers v.
Commr. of Taxation, 283 Minn. 111, 167
N.W.2d 712 (1969), this court denied tax-<>xempt status to a retirement apartment complex where the basic financial plan of the
project wa.g to create the capital structure
by the proceeds of a membership fee. This
court denied tax-exempt status to a similar
retirement apartment complex in the case
of State v. United Church Homes, 292 Minn.
323, 195 N.W.2d 411 (1972).
The situation at Rio Vista cannot be distinguished easily from these cases. The
monthly basic rents presently charged at
Rio Vista are $125 for a I-bedroom unit and
$165 for a 2-bedroom unit, plus electricity.
The commercial nature of the operation is
also renected in the fact that a tenant may
be evicted for failure to pay rent. Further,
the exhibits indicate that rents cover approximately 77 percent of the total operating costs at Rio Vista.
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However, our reading of the record also
indicates that much of this rent is actually
paid by the Federal Government. Thus,
rents actually paid by tenants are not the
major source of revenue to the project.
This is a distinguishing feature of the Rio
Vista situation: Tenants receive the housing at considerably less than market value
or cost. This is unlike the situation in the
Camping & Education Foundation, Madonna To"'ers, and United Church Homes
cases.
[5] Considering all six factors, we conclude that Rio Vista is an institution of
purely public charity. Admittedly, the
question is close. The decision of the trial
court is supported by a well-reasoned memorandum. Nevertheless, we conclude that
Rio Vista meets the standards and definitions devised by this court for qualification
as an institution of purely public charity.
The fact that a purely public charity receives some remuneration from those it
benefits does not deprive the institution of
its charitable exemption. The amount of
remuneration in relation to benefits conferred always require an analysis of the
facts of each case.
[6] 2. We find no merit to the state's
contention that institutions of purely public
charity lose their tax-£xempt status by reason of Minn.St. 273.13, subd. 17, which provides that Title II housing for the elderly or
for low and moderate income families shall
be assessed at 20 percent of the market
value for the purpose of real property taxes." There is no question that Rio Vista's
property is Title II housing However, it is
argued by Rio Vista that § 273.13 is a
classification statute rather than a taxing
statute, and therefore the statute has no
10. Mmn St 273 13, subd 17, provides "A
structure situated on real property that 1s used
for housing for the elderly or for low and moderate income families as defined by Title JI of
the Natwnal Housing Act or the Minnesota
housing finance agency law of 1971 or regulations promulgated by the agency pursuant
thereto and financed bv a direct Federal loan or
Federally insured
or a loan made by the
Minnesota housing finance agency pursuant to
the provisions of either of said acts and acts

application to tax-£xempl institotions or
purely public charity.
We agree. Se<:tion 273.13, subd. 1, states:
"All real and personal property subject
to a general property tax and not subject

to any gross earnings or other lieu tax is
hereby classified for purposes of taxation
as provided by this section." (Italics supplied.)

Giving effect to this language, the 20-percenl assessment under§ 273.13, subd. 17, is
not applicable to tax-.,xempl property because such property is not "subject to a
general property tax." Section 273.13 classifies property which is already subject to
taxation; it does not authorize the imposition of a new tax on otherwise untaxed
property.
Our conclusion is supported by other statutory provisions. Institutions or purely
public charity derive their exemptions from
taxation under the provisions of Minn.St.
272.02. According to the language of that
section, the tax-£xempt status is limited
only by the provisions set forth in §§ 272.02
and 272.02.5. Had the legislature intended
to limit or remove the tax-£xempt status of
charitable Title II housing, it could have
provided such in § 272.02 or § 272.025. By
placing the provision for a 20-percent tax
on Title II housing in § 273.13, we hold that
the tax-£xempt status of Rio Vista is unaffected and that the 20-percent tax does not
apply to tax-.,xempl institutions of purely
public charity.
Reversed.
OTIS, J ., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
amendatory thereof shall, for 15 years from the
date of the completion of the original construction or substantial rehabihtatJon, or for the
original term of the loan. be assessed at 20-percent of the market value thereof, provided that
the fair market value as determined by the
assessor 1s based on the normal approach to
value using normal unrestricted rents "
Subd l 7a provides· "The provision of subdivtsion 17 shall apply only to non-profit and
limited dividend entitles "

